Short-run, targeted subsidies for health products are common in poor countries. How do they a¤ect long-run adoption? Standard economic theory predicts that they may increase long-run adoption through experience and social learning e¤ects. Those e¤ects will be muted, however, if subsidized products are unused or misused. Subsidies have also been argued to generate "entitlement e¤ects": people may refuse to pay for products that were once free. A …eld experiment was designed to estimate the relative importance of these competing e¤ects. We …nd that, for a health product with high private returns (an antimalarial bednet), positive experience and social learning e¤ects largely dominate.
Introduction
Between nine and ten million children under …ve die every year in the world. 1 It is estimated that nearly two thirds of these deaths could be averted using existing preventative technologies, such as vaccines, insecticide-treated materials, vitamin supplementation, or point-of-use chlorination of drinking water. 2 A major outstanding question is how to increase availability and adoption of these technologies.
A commonly proposed way to increase adoption in the short-run is to distribute those essential health products for free or at highly subsidized prices (WHO, 2007; Sachs, 2005) .
There are two main reasons to do so. First, most of these products generate positive health externalities, and private investment in them will be socially suboptimal without a subsidy.
Second, when the majority of the population is poor and credit-constrained, subsidies might be necessary to ensure widespread access (Cohen and Dupas, 2010) .
For some products, such as vaccines, one-time adoption is su¢ cient to generate important health impacts. Short-run subsidies are well-suited for such technologies. But for other products, such as anti-malarial bednets, water treatment kits, or condoms, sustained adoption is required to generate the hoped-for health impacts. A key question is whether one-time subsidies for such technologies increase or dampen private investments in them in the long-run.
The standard neoclassical model of consumer behavior predicts that free or highly subsidized distribution of a product in the short-run may increase demand in the long-run if the product is an experience good. Bene…ciaries of a free or highly subsidized sample will be more willing to pay for a replacement after experiencing the bene…ts and learning the true value of the product. This learning might trickle down to others in the community (those ineligible for the subsidy) and increase the overall willingness to pay in the population as knowledge of the true value of the product di¤uses. Furthermore, if short-run adoption of the product leads to positive health and productivity e¤ects, bene…ciaries of a subsidized sample might have more cash-on-hand to invest in sustained adoption. 1 Black et al, 2003 . 2 Jones et al., 2003. However, these positive learning e¤ects require that people make use of a product or technology that they receive for free or at a highly subsidized price. This might not be the case. Households who are not willing to pay a high monetary price for a product might also be unwilling to pay the non-monetary costs associated with using the product. Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro (forthcoming) …nd evidence of such negative selection e¤ects of subsidies for a water-chlorination product in urban Zambia.
Furthermore, consumers could take previously encountered prices as reference points, or anchors, which would a¤ect their subsequent reservation price (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006) .
Such e¤ects, known in psychology as "background contrast e¤ects" and …rst identi…ed experimentally by Simonson and Tversky (1992) , have recently been observed outside the lab by Simonsohn and Loewenstein (2006) , who show that otherwise comparable households spend less money in rent in a city they have just moved to if the city they came from has cheaper housing. Under such reference-dependent preferences, subsidies could generate an "entitlement e¤ect": those who receive a subsidy for a health product may anchor around the subsidized price and be unwilling to pay a higher price for the product once the subsidy ends or is reduced. For example, Kremer and Miguel (2007) …nd that parents in Kenya who were exposed to free deworming treatment for their children for a year were extremely unwilling to pay for deworming once it stopped being free. Reference-dependent preferences might also generate a "relative price e¤ect" for those not targeted by the subsidy, if their reservation price is a¤ected by the subsidized price they see being o¤ered to others.
The view that these negative e¤ects might dominate, making short-run subsidies detrimental to long-run adoption, is not uncommon among development practitioners. As the Boston Globe put it: "The Holy Grail of international development has long been sustainability -[...] for several decades it's been the conventional wisdom that unless people spend money on something they will be unlikely to value it -or use it. Give things away and they will be taken for granted, it's thought." In this paper, we report on a …eld experiment designed to test the relative importance of these potential and competing e¤ects of subsidies in the adoption and di¤usion of a new health technology. The technology considered is the Olyset long-lasting insecticidetreated bed net (LLIN), a recent innovation in malaria control. The experiment involved 1,120 households in Kenya and included two phases. In Phase 1, subsidy levels for LLINs were randomly assigned across households within six villages, with the maximum subsidy level randomized across villages. Households had three months to acquire the LLIN at the subsidized price they had been assigned to. Prices varied from $0 to $3.80. (For comparison, the average daily wage for casual agricultural work in the study area is estimated at $1.85).
After a few months, a subset of households were o¤ered the opportunity to acquire another health product (a water treatment product) at a uniform positive price. In Phase 2, a year later, all households in four villages were given a second opportunity to acquire an LLIN, but this time everyone faced the same price ($2.30). Phase 2 was unannounced, therefore at the time individuals made their purchasing decision in Phase 1, they were not aware that they would receive a second chance to acquire the product a year later. The LLIN was not available outside of the experiment, but other types of nets were available on the market at the retail price of $1.50. This experimental design allows us to test multiple hypotheses on the e¤ects of temporary subsidies on demand, both over time and across individuals.
First, we can study the importance of the entitlement e¤ect by examining whether having been exposed to a full or very large subsidy for an LLIN in Phase 1 reduces willingness to pay for an LLIN in Phase 2, a year later. We …nd no support for the hypothesis that entitlement e¤ects can o¤set the standard positive e¤ects. Instead, we …nd suggestive evidence that gaining access to a free or highly subsidized LLIN in the …rst year increases households'
reported as well as observed willingness to pay for an LLIN a year later. In the context of subsidies for bednets, experience and income e¤ects thus seem to dominate entitlement e¤ects.
Second, we can test for the presence of cross-product entitlement e¤ects, namely, whether being exposed to a full or very large subsidy for an LLIN generates an expectation that other health products should also be heavily subsidized. We …nd that households who received a free LLIN in Phase 1 were, if anything, slightly more likely than other households to invest in the water-treatment product o¤ered at the end of Phase 1. This suggests that cross-entitlement e¤ects are outweighed by income and possibly complementarity e¤ects.
Third, we use the variation in the maximum subsidy level o¤ered across villages in Phase 1 to test for relative price e¤ects, i.e., whether a household's reservation price is a¤ected by the lowest price o¤ered in that household's environment. We …nd no evidence that households are less likely to buy an LLIN at a given positive price if others around them face a lower price for the same LLIN. This suggests that if there are relative price e¤ects, they must be outweighed by social learning e¤ects.
Fourth, exogenous variation in the density of households who received a free or highly subsidized LLIN in Phase 1 enables us to formally test for the presence of di¤usion e¤ects through social networks (social learning). We …nd that households facing a positive price in Phase 1 are more likely to purchase the LLIN when the density of households around them who received a free or highly subsidized LLIN is greater. Our preferred estimates suggests that, at any given positive LLIN price, a household with 50% of highly subsidized LLIN recipients among study households living within a 500 meter radius is 11 percentage points (28%) more likely to buy the LLIN than a household with no such bene…ciary within a 500 meter radius.
This paper is most closely related to Kremer and Miguel (2007) , who use a randomized evaluation of a school-based deworming program in Kenya to estimate, among other things, the role of peer e¤ects in health technology adoption. They …nd that households were less likely to invest in deworming if they had a higher number of social contacts who bene…tted from free deworming in the past. Their negative e¤ect is consistent with the model of social learning this paper …nds evidence for. The di¤erence between the two papers in the direction of the information spillover is likely to come from the di¤erence in the ratio of private returns to non-monetary costs. While bednet use has high private returns and moderate non-monetary costs, deworming has only low private returns and non-trivial side e¤ects. The …ndings of this paper also help shed light on the Kremer and Miguel (2007) result that demand for deworming treatment drops precipitously when the price becomes positive. Their experimental design did not allow a test of whether this drop was due to "entitlement" e¤ects or to low perceived private returns of deworming. Our results, based on data from the same area of Kenya, suggest that entitlement might not have been the main e¤ect at play in the drop observed in Kremer and Miguel (2007) .
More broadly, this paper contributes to two literatures. First, the paper contributes to a now large literature on the role of learning-by-doing and social learning in technology adoption in poor countries. The evidence so far, mostly non-experimental and mostly focused on agricultural technologies, is rather mixed and suggests that the role of social learning is likely to vary greatly with the context and the product considered. 4 The second literature this paper contributes to is the empirical reference-dependence literature estimating how the willingness to pay for a product can be a¤ected by anchors ( Our experiment brings together these two existing strands of literature and provides evidence that, for essential preventative health products in a poor country, the total e¤ect of short-run subsidies on long-run adoption is positive. Previously encountered prices matter, but more so through their e¤ect on available knowledge about the product than through contrast or entitlement e¤ects.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a simple framework to think about technology adoption in the presence of learning by experience, social learning and reference-dependent preferences. Section 3 describes the background and the experimental design. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes. 4 Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Besley and Case (1997) …nd that a farmer's ability to reap pro…ts from a new technology increases with not only her own but also her neighbors'experience with the new technology, but Munshi (2004) …nds that social learning requires a certain degree of homogeneity among farmers, and Bandiera and Rasul (2006) …nd some evidence of strategic delay in adoption of new products. Conley and Udry (forthcoming) present evidence that social learning is important in the di¤usion of knowledge regarding pineapple cultivation in Ghana, while the randomized experiment of Du ‡o, Kremer and Robinson (2009) …nds no social learning in fertilizer use in Western Kenya. There are few empirical studies of social learning outside agriculture. Behrman et al. (2001) study social networks of young women in rural Kenya and …nd evidence of S-shaped di¤usion of attitudes and behaviors with respect to contraception and AIDS. Munshi and Myaux (2006) provide suggestive evidence from India that a woman's contraception decision responds strongly to changes in contraceptive prevalence in her own religious group within the village but not to changes outside her religious network. Oster and Thornton (2008) …nd evidence of peer e¤ects in the usage of a new female hygiene product provided for free.
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Theoretical Framework
This section presents a general framework for understanding the adoption of a new preventative health technology. The goal is to clarify the potential channels through which a one-time subsidy can change the long-run level of adoption, and to provide empirically implementable tests of their relative importance.
We consider a technology for which health-e¤ective adoption requires not only acquiring the technology each period, but also actively using it throughout the period. In addition to anti-malarial bednets, examples of such technologies include water chlorination, water …lter, iron pills, condoms, among others. At the time people decide whether to acquire the technology, they are uncertain about both the e¤ectiveness of the technology and the cost associated with using the technology. They choose to acquire it if the expected private bene…ts exceed the total expected private costs (monetary cost + usage cost). As soon as they acquire the technology, people learn its true usage cost (say, by using it for a day).
They then decide to use it consistently if the expected private bene…ts exceed the observed usage cost.
People have two sources of information: their own experimentation with the technology, and the experience of their neighbors. Learning about the usage cost is immediate upon ownership of the product, but learning about the e¤ectiveness takes time.
Assumptions
Preferences
Utility of individual i is composed of two additive terms: intrinsic utility and gain-loss utility.
Intrinsic utility is a function of absolute outcomes, expected private bene…ts and expected private costs. Gain-loss utility captures reference-dependence.
As in Kremer and Miguel (2007) , suppose that the total private bene…t to using the health technology depends on the individual's health level , the e¤ectivess of the technology , and an indiosyncratic individual speci…c taste for health i . Individual health level at period t, it , may depend on individual characteristics X i , and on the overall rate of adoption of the health technology among neighbors at time t (e.g., malaria is transmitted from person to person, so one is less likely to get malaria if one's neighbors are malaria-free because they have adopted an antimalarial technology).
There are two types of costs associated with the technology: the …nancial cost of acquiring the product (price p); and the time or utility costs of using the product, denoted by c.
Following K½ oszegi and Rabin (2006), we formalize reference-dependence as follows. Denotep it individual's i reference price for the technology at time t. Paying a price p it for the technology generate gain-loss utility r(p it p it ): To allow for loss aversion, we allow r to be kinked at zero. The simplest way to formalize it is to consider that r is two-piece linear, and has a slope G 0 for gains (whenp it pi t ), and a slope of L G for losses (when p it < p it ).
Let^ it andĉ it denote the individual's beliefs in period t about the technology's e¤ec-tiveness and the usage cost c, respectively, conditional on prior beliefs and any signals received. Let T it 2 f0; 1g be an indicator variable for usage of the technology in period t.
Then the individuals'expected private bene…t from adoption can be expressed as:
where U is individual utility, conditional on the treatment choices of other individuals. 5 Finally, let n it 2 f0; 1g be an indicator variable for purchase of the technology in period t.
Information Sets
When the new technology is introduced, all individuals have a common prior belief about its e¤ectiveness, denoted^ i0 N ( 0 ; 2 0 ), 8i. The mean 0 may be greater or equal than the actual e¤ectiveness . In particular, 0 could be less than if the status quo technology (e.g., earlier types of moquito nets) is less e¤ective than the new technology. 5 We assume that individuals do not consider the additional motive of adopting in order to learn more about the costs or the e¤ectiveness of the technology. Such a motive would make the problem intractable. 6 The prior belief about the e¤ectiveness of the product could also be an increasing function of the observed price (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991) . If people face di¤erent prices, they might start with heterogeneous priors. We abstract from this here, and shut down this mechanism in the experiment by informing everyone of the unsubsidized price. Alternatively, the prior belief about the e¤ectiveness could be an increasing function of the subsidy size. If so, this would reinforce the standard learning e¤ects of subsidies.
Likewise, all individuals have a common prior belief about the cost of using the new technology, denotedĉ i0 N (c 0 ;
Here again, c 0 may be greater or equal than the actual cost c, and is likely to depend on the cost of using the status quo technology.
To update beliefs, individuals use both their own experience and that of J peers. All individuals who buy the technology obtain a perfect signal about its usage cost c. All individuals who use the technology obtain a signal about e¤ectiveness. These signals are noisy due to unobservable individual time-speci…c shocks to health status. Let these signals have mean and variance 2 .
We consider that each individual i has a location on a two-dimensional map, and that J signals are drawn from the set of individuals within a distance d in each direction. If a fraction w it of individuals in this radius adopted (i.e., bought and used) the product in period t, individual i receives w it J signals from social contacts, and T it 2 f0; 1g personal signal. Bayesian individual i who receives T it = w it J + T it signals will weight her prior beliefs and signals received such that the posterior belief on expected e¤ectiveness becomes:
where^ i0 is the mean of the prior distribution, s is the sample average of signals received through the social network, and 2 T 2 = T it denotes the variance of the sample average.
The more neighbors use the technology and generate a signal, the lower the variance of the sample average and the value of both the sample average and posterior beliefs approach the true expected e¤ectiveness, :
Individuals can also learn about the true cost of using the technology from their neighbors, if they have not learned it by acquiring the product themselves. We consider that for individual i who does not know the true cost of using the product at time t 1, the belief about the cost of usage at time t + 1 is updated as follows:
where ! it is the share of contacts who acquired the product and is the probability that one of them tells individual i what the true usage cost is.
Finally, we need to consider how the reference pricep it evolves. We assume that prior to the introduction of the technology, all individuals have a common reference pointp 0 , based on the cost of the status quo technology. After the technology is introduced in period k, we suppose that individual i in market m revises her reference price top i;k+t = minfp mk g; 8t 1.
In other words, the individual "anchors" around the lowest price observed in the nearby market.
To summarize, the timing of information revelation and decision making is as follows:
Beginning of Period t Period t Beginning of Period t+1
Beliefs 
Analytical results
In this section we establish some static and dynamic predictions of the model that can be tested empirically. We begin by solving for the optimal purchase and usage decisions.
When the technology is introduced at time t, individual i will purchase the technology if
Those who buy the technology will decide to use it if the observed usage cost c satis…es:
Thus individual i will buy the technology but not use it if and only if:
If condition (3) holds, then individual i will own the product and learn the usage cost c, but will not get a personal signal about the e¤ectiveness .
Comparative Statics: the Role of Prices and Beliefs
Price Our key variable of interest is price. All else equal, a lower price increases the likelihood that people buy the product, and therefore learn the true usage cost. Whether a lower price increases the likelihood of adoption is unclear, however, and depends on the usage cost. If people underestimate the usage cost, condition (3) may hold. The lower the price, the more likely it is to hold: people who: (1) underestimate the cost of usage and (2) expect low bene…ts, might be induced to buy the technology if the price is low, but they may not use it once they learn the true usage cost. There would then be no learning about the e¤ectiveness of the product for those subsidy recipients.
In the experiment below, we …nd that adoption decreases monotonically with price (increases monotonically with the subsidy level). We take it as evidence that people tend to overstimate the usage cost of LLINs and therefore high subsidies can help increase immediate adoption and learning.
In contrast, Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro (forthcoming) …nd that higher subsidies increase the fraction of people who acquire a water chlorination product but do not use it. This suggests that a fraction of people underestimate the cost of using chlorine in their water (for example, they underestimate how bad their water will taste if they use chlorine), and as a result, condition (3) holds for them.
Beliefs Another key variable whose evolution drives changes in adoption is the belief about the e¤ectiveness of the technology. It is straightforward to show that a higher expected e¤ectiveness increases the probability that an individual acquires the technology, and chooses to use it, all else equal.
For technologies that are radically new (e.g., in that they rely on unknown scienti…c prin-ciples), individuals might start with pessimistic beliefs and adoption might be very limited, unless the technology is heavily subsidized for at least some individuals. A good example is that of insecticide-treated curtains, that provide the inseciticide halo necessary to repel mosquitoes but do not provide the intuitive "physical barrier" against mosquitoes that people tend to think is the critical component of a bed net.
In contrast, in a context like ours below, where the status quo technology is already relatively good and the new technology is similar in spirit to the old technology (e.g., the status quo technology is an insecticide-treated net and the new technology is a long-lasting insecticide treated net, as in our application), individuals may have relatively optimistic priors about the e¤ectiveness of the new technology.
Reference point In the presence of a status quo technology, and if r( ) is non-zero, people anchor around the price of the status quo technology. All else equal, this reduces adoption of the new technology if the price of the new technology is above the price of the status quo technology, and increases adoption of the new technology if the price is below the price of the status quo technology.
Dynamic E¤ects
Over Time For individual i, the impact of having faced price p it in period t on expected private bene…ts of adoption in period t + 1 (when the price has become
is the sum of three terms:
The …rst term on the right-hand side represents learning by doing about the technology's e¤ectiveness. It can be positive or negative depending on whether the individual prior overestimate or underestimate the true private bene…ts of adoption, and zero if the price in period t is such that individual i does not experiment with the product at period t. The second term represents learning about the cost of using the product. Again, it can be positive or negative depending on the di¤erence between the prior and the true usage cost. The third term is the positive anchoring e¤ect.
In the experiment below, we …nd a negative e¤ect of the period 1 price (the sum of the four e¤ects is negative). We take it as evidence that lower prices (higher subsidies) enable learning, and that the anchoring e¤ect is inexistent or too small to dominate the learning e¤ect.
Across Households The impact of the share of neighbors who adopt the product on the expected private bene…ts of adoption is the sum of three e¤ects:
The …rst term on the right-hand side represents social learning about the technology's effectiveness. It can be positive or negative depending on whether the individual prior underestimate or overestimate the true private bene…ts of adoption. The second term represents social learning about the cost of using the product. Again, it can be positive or negative depending on the di¤erence between the prior and the true usage cost, and it can be zero if the individual learned the cost of usage by acquiring the product herself. The third term is the health externality, which is zero for non-infectious diseases and negative for infectious diseases, since having more neighbors protected reduced the chances of transmission.
In the experiment below, we …nd a positive social e¤ect overall (the sum of the three e¤ects is positive). We take it as evidence that information e¤ects are positive and that the health externality is either too small, or too unobservable by individuals, to dominate the learning e¤ect.
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3 Background and Experimental Design
Background on Malaria and Bednet distribution in Kenya
Over the past two decades, the use of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) has been established through multiple randomized trials as an e¤ective and cost-e¤ective malaria control strategy for sub-Saharan Africa (Lengeler, 2004) . In our study sample, 80% of households owned at least one bednet (of any kind) at baseline, but given the large average household size, the coverage rate at the individual level was still low, with only 41% of household members regularly sleeping under a net (Table 1) .
About 33% of households had an LLIN of the brand PermaNet R at baseline. The PermaNet LLINs were received free from the government during a mass distribution scheme targeting parents of children under 5 and conducted in conjunction with the Measles campaign of July 2006, ten months before the onset of this study. These PermaNets di¤er substantially from the Olyset LLIN used in our experiment: they are circular and not rectangular, made of polyester and not polyethylene, and have a smaller mesh. They cannot be distinguished from traditional re-treatable nets with the naked eye, while Olyset nets can. 7 In 2002, the NGO Population Services International (PSI) started implementing a Kenya-wide social marketing campaign for bednets. Until 2004, bednets were subsidized but remained expensive, at Ksh300 ($4.50). In 2004, PSI started selling ITNs to pregnant women and parents of under-…ves for Ksh50 ($0.75) at health facilities, and to the general population through the retail sector at prices starting at Ksh100 ($1.50).
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Experimental Design: Phase 1
The experiment was conducted in Busia District, Western Kenya, where malaria transmission occurs throughout the year. The study involved 1,120 households from six rural areas.
Participating households were sampled as follows. In each area, the school register was used to create a list of households with children. 8 Listed households were then randomly assigned to a subsidy level for an LLIN. The subsidy level varied from 100% to 40%; the corresponding …nal prices faced by households ranged from 0 to 250 Kenyan Shillings (Ksh), or at the prevailing exchange rate of 65 Ksh to US$1 at the time, from 0 to US$3.8. Seventeen di¤erent prices were o¤ered in total, but each area, depending on its size, was assigned only four or …ve of these 17 prices. Thus, if an area was assigned the price set {Ksh 50, 100, 150, 200, 250}, all the study households in the area were randomly assigned to one of these …ve prices according to a computer-generated random number. All price sets included high, intermediate, and low subsidy levels. However, the lowest price o¤ered in a given area was randomly varied across areas, and drawn from the following set: {0, 40, 50, 70}. Only two areas had a price set that included free distribution for some households; one area had a minimum price of 40 Ksh; two areas had a minimum price of 50 Ksh; and one area had a minimum price of 70 Ksh.
After the random assignment to subsidy levels had been performed in o¢ ce, trained enumerators visited each sampled household. A baseline survey was administered to the female and/or male head of each consenting household. 10 At the end of the interview, the respondent was given a discount voucher for an LLIN corresponding to the randomly assigned subsidy level. The voucher indicated (1) its expiration date, (2) where it could be redeemed, (3) the …nal (post-discount) price to be paid to the retailer for the net, and (4) the recommended retail price and the amount discounted from the recommended retail price. 11 Vouchers could be redeemed at participating local retailers (1 per area). The six participating retailers were provided with a stock of blue, extra-large, rectangular Olyset nets. At the time of the study, extra-large Olyset nets were not available to households through any other distribution channel, which facilitated tracking of the LLINs that were sold as part of the study.
The participating retailers received as many Olysets as vouchers issued in their community, and no more. They were not authorized to sell the study Olysets to households outside the study sample. For each redeemed voucher, the retailers were instructed to note the voucher identi…cation number and the date of redemption in a standardized receipt book designed for the experiment. The list of redeemed vouchers and the vouchers stubs themselves were collected from retailers every 2 weeks. 12 The subset of households who had redeemed their LLIN voucher were sampled for a short-run follow-up administered during an unannounced home visit 2 months on average after the voucher had been redeemed. During the follow-up visit, enumerators asked to see the net that was purchased with the voucher, so as to ascertain that it was a study-supplied
Olyset LLIN. The follow-up survey also checked whether households had been charged the assigned price for the LLIN. Usage was assessed as follows: (1) whether the respondent declared having started using the net, and (2) whether the net was observed hanging above the bedding at the time of the visit. In addition, willingness to pay to replace the study LLIN was assessed by asking households the following question: "If you didn't have this net, up to how much would you be willing to pay to get a net like this, now that you are familiar with it?"
Note that, while the main advantage of the Olyset LLIN is its long-lasting property, it can easily be di¤erentiated from other nets in the short run: it is sturdier than other nets because it is made of polyethylene (and not polyester) and it is also more comfortable (less 11 The fact that the recommended retail price was indicated on the voucher could have dampened the possibility of anchoring e¤ects. From a policy standpoint, indicating the non-subsidized price on a voucher or product is costless, therefore estimating the overall e¤ect of subsidies in the presence of full information about the non-subsidized price is the relevant policy parameter. 12 Participating retailers were not allowed to keep the proceeds of the study Olyset sales. However, as an incentive to follow the protocol, participating retailers were promised a …xed sum of $75 to be paid upon completion of the study, irrespective of the number of nets sold but conditional on the study rules being strictly respected. hot) thanks to its wider mesh.
Experimental Design: Phase 2
In a subset of areas (4 out of 6), a long-run follow-up was conducted 12 months after the distribution of the …rst LLIN voucher. 13 All households in those areas were sampled for the long-run follow-up (both those who had redeemed their …rst voucher, and those who had not). Data on the incidence of malaria in the previous month was collected. Households By comparing the take-up rate of the second, uniformly-priced voucher across Phase 1 price groups, we can test whether being exposed to a large or full subsidy dampens or enhances willingness to pay for the same product a year later. Note, however, that since LLIN have a lifespan of 4 to 5 years, at the time they received the second LLIN voucher, households who had purchased an LLIN with the …rst voucher in Phase 1 did not need to replace their …rst LLIN. The redemption rate of the second voucher thus measures, for those households, the willingness to pay for an additional LLIN, and not a replacement LLIN. If we make the reasonable assumption of decreasing marginal returns to LLINs, the willingness to pay observed through the second voucher redemption will be a lower bound for the willingness to pay for a replacement LLIN.
Verifying Randomization
A baseline survey was administered at households'homes between April and October 2007, prior to the …st voucher distribution. The baseline survey assessed household demographics, socioeconomic status, and bednet ownership and coverage. Table 1 presents summary statistics on 15 household characteristics, and their correlation with the randomized 1 st LLIN price assignment. Speci…cally, we regress each baseline characteristic on a quadratic in the price faced in Phase 1 and a set of area …xed e¤ects:
where x hj is a baseline characteristics of household h in area j and P hj1 is the price faced by household h in Phase 1. We report the coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors for 1 (column 3) and 2 (column 4). All of the coe¢ cient estimates are small in magnitude and none can be statistically distinguished from zero, suggesting that the randomization was succesful at making the price assignment orthogonal to observable baseline characteristics. 14 
Verifying Compliance
The sales logs kept by participating retailers show that, in total over Phase 1 and Phase 2, 95% of the redeemed vouchers were redeemed by a member of the household that had received the voucher. Only two of the individuals that redeemed a voucher declared having paid to acquire the voucher, and all households that redeemed their vouchers declared, when interviewed at follow-up, that they had been charged the assigned price when they redeemed their voucher at the shop. This suggests that participating retailers respected the study protocol, and that there was almost no arbitrage between households prior to voucher redemption.
To check for potential arbitrage after redemption (i.e., people selling the LLIN to their neighbor after having redeemed the voucher), we conducted unannounced home visits and asked to see the LLIN that had been purchased with the voucher (the study-provided nets were easily recognizable). These home visits were conducted after both Phase 1 and Phase 2. Overall, more than 90% of households that had redeemed a voucher could show the LLIN during the spot check.
Results
Take-up of the …rst LLIN: Voucher Redemption and Usage
The e¤ects of subsidies on take-up and usage of the Phase 1 LLIN are presented in Figure 1 .
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that the take-up of the …rst voucher is highly sensitive to price:
take-up is quasi-universal for free LLIN vouchers (at 97.5%), but drops to 60-70% when the price is between 40 and 90 Ksh (between $0.6 and $1.4), and further drops to around 30% when the price crosses the 100 Ksh threshold ($1.5). In contrast, Panel B of Figure 1 , which shows usage rates (among those who redeemed their voucher), suggests that the likelihood that people put the LLIN to use within two months or within a year does not increase with price.
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These two main …ndings-take-up is highly sensitive to price but usage is independent of price-are robust to adding household-level controls (regression analysis available upon request). In the terms of the framework presented in Section 2, these …ndings suggest there are no households for whom condition (3) holds. To the contrary, households seem to overestimate the usage cost of the LLIN, and this dampens their demand at even modest positive prices. These results thus con…rm that the …ndings obtained among pregnant women by Cohen and Dupas (2010) hold for the general population and over time.
Long-Run E¤ects of Direct Exposure
This section tests whether households who bene…tted from a free or highly subsidized LLIN in Phase 1 were more or less willing to pay for a LLIN in Phase 2, when the price was high for everyone. We test this using both declared preferences and revealed preferences.
First, we look at how households'declared willingness to pay for a bed net was a¤ected by the subsidy. This is presented in Figures 2 and 3 , which are restricted to the sample of households that redeemed their …rst voucher. Figure 2 presents two averages for each Phase 1 price group: the average willingness to pay for a bednet declared at baseline, before households had received the …rst voucher; and the average willingness to pay declared at the follow-up, when households were asked: "If you didn't have this net, up to how much would you be willing to pay to get a net like this, now that you are familiar with it?".
These two averages can be considered as the "before" and "after" willingness to pay for those that redeemed their …rst voucher. Figure 2 shows that the willingness to pay increased substantially and signi…cantly for all households, and especially for those households who received large subsidies. While part of this increase could be imputed to a general increase in awareness of malaria issues in Kenya over time, or to an increase in households'wealth level over time, the e¤ect is too large to be explained by a simple time trend, suggesting that the large subsidies might have enabled households to learn the bene…ts associated with the net. 16 In Figure 3 , we directly test for the presence of "anchoring"by looking at the gap between households'declared willingness to pay (both before and after) and the price paid in Phase 1.
We show the distribution of this gap separately for three broad price categories (free, price < 100 Ksh and price 100 Ksh). The …rst row shows the distribution of the gap "before"
(before households received the …rst voucher) and the second row shows the distribution of the gap "after"(at follow-up). The evidence in Figure 3 suggets that households who paid a positive price anchored somewhat around the o¤ered price: at follow-up, the distribution of the gap narrows around zero. This is not the case for households that received a free LLIN in Phase 1, however. For those, the density at zero is lower at the follow-up than at baseline, suggesting no anchoring at all.
Declared willingness to pay might su¤er from social desirability bias, however. For this reason, it is important to also look at revealed preferences, namely, the take-up of the second LLIN. The price of the second voucher was uniform across all households (at 150 Ksh). Figure 4 presents the average purchase rate for the second LLIN o¤ered, for each Phase 1 price group. The con…dence intervals are large, but the average take-up was higher among the higher subsidy groups (free and 40-50 Ksh price groups).
The regression analysis presented in Table 2 con…rms this result. Columns 1 through 6 estimate the following reduced form equations:
where Y hj2 is a dummy equal to 1 if household h in village j bought a LLIN in Phase 2;
1(P hj1 50) is a dummy equal to 1 if the price faced by household h was a high-subsidy price (below 50Ksh); and the other variables are de…ned as above.
The take-up in the '1st LLIN Free'group is 6.2 percentage points (41%) higher than in the non-free groups, suggesting a learning-by-doing e¤ect ( it is worth noting that the take-up of the second LLIN voucher in this group re ‡ects the demand for a second LLIN, whereas for most households that received a high price for the …rst voucher, the take-up of the second voucher re ‡ects the demand for a …rst LLIN (since take-up of the …rst voucher was low at high prices). Under the reasonable assumption that the marginal utility of LLINs is decreasing in the number of LLINs owned, holding everything constant, the demand for a second LLIN should be lower than the demand for a …rst LLIN.
In other words, the fact that the take-up for the second voucher is not signi…cantly lower in the '1st LLIN free'group than in the low-subsidy groups is enough to conclude that the willingness to pay in the '1st LLIN free'group increased.
Columns 10-12 of Table 2 estimate the following equation:
where U hj1 indicates whether household h used an LLIN in Phase 1 (i.e., not only bought the LLIN in Phase 1 but also used it), and is instrumented with either the price faced in Phase 1 and its square (column 10); a dummy indicating whether the price faced in Phase 1 was zero (full subsidy, column 11); or a dummy indicating whether the price phased in Phase 1 was 50Ksh or lower (high subsidy, column 12). The three possible …rst-stage estimations are presented in columns 7-9 of Table 2 .
The estimates of in these instrumental variables speci…cations measure the e¤ect "on the treated", that is the e¤ect of having experimented with the …rst LLIN. The e¤ect is close to a 90% increase in take-up of the second LLIN (+13 percentage points o¤ of a 15 percent mean in the non-free group) and the signi…cance approaches 10% (the p-value of the coe¢ cient on "experimented" in column 10 is 0.14). Note, however, that the exclusion restriction for the instrument (the price of the …rst voucher a¤ects willingness to pay for the second LLIN only through the learning e¤ect) does not hold in the presence of contrast or entitlement e¤ects. Thus our preferred speci…cations are the reduced form speci…cations presented in columns 1-6.
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2 present a speci…cation with a "high subsidy" dummy (1st LLIN price 50 Ksh). As was apparent in Figure 4 , the high-subsidy group in Phase 1 had a higher redemption rate in Phase 2 than the other groups. The e¤ect of having received a high subsidy in Phase 1 is signi…cant at the 10 percent level, both without and with household level controls. The IV estimates (column 12) is also signi…cant at the 10 percent level, although as discussed above the IV speci…cation is not valid in the presence of entitlement e¤ects.
Overall, these results suggest that potential negative anchoring or entitlement e¤ects of subsidies are at best limited in scope, and in any case overwhelmed by a positive e¤ect.
Experience or Income E¤ect?
The previous section suggests that households who received a free or highly subsidized LLIN are not less likely to buy a second one after a year. Rather, they appear more likely to buy a second net, despite the fact that most of them already own one. In Section 2, the mechanism generating this positive e¤ect on willingness to pay for an LLIN is the experience e¤ect (the subsidy enables households to learn about the bene…ts of a technology). In the presence of credit-constraints (ignored in the theoretical framework), the positive e¤ect could also come from a wealth e¤ect, which itself can come from a mechanical e¤ect of the subsidy on the intertemporal budget constraint (those who paid less for the LLIN in year 1 have more money available to invest in an LLIN in year 2); and from a positive health e¤ect on disposable income (households that received the subsidy and adopt the product are less likely to su¤er from malaria; this increases their productivity and decreases their malaria treatment expenditures and therefore increases their disposable income). Indeed, we …nd some suggestive evidence, presented in Appendix Table A2 , that the incidence of malaria among household heads (either the male or the female) was lower among households who received a cheaper LLIN voucher in Phase 1. This e¤ect is not surprising given the large medical literature showing large private returns to bednet use (Lengeler, 2004) . Given the existing evidence of a link from health to productivity at the micro level (Strauss and Thomas, 1998), this health e¤ect among household heads could potentially have generated an income e¤ect.
We do not have data on income itself (precise income data is typically di¢ cult to measure among the self-employed, who make the great majority of our sample). Instead, in order to test for the relative importance of the income / budget constraint e¤ects, we If the experience e¤ect is the main channel behind the positive e¤ect of willingness to pay for the second LLIN observed in Table 2 , the take-up of the WaterGuard voucher should be completely independent of the (random) price households faced for their …rst LLIN voucher.
Alternatively, if bene…ciaries of free LLINs have higher disposable income because of the subsidy and the positive health impact of the …rst LLIN, the take-up of the WaterGuard product should also increase, provided clean water is a normal good. Table 3 presents evidence on how the subsidy level for the LLIN a¤ected take-up of the WaterGuard voucher in the two areas selected for this exercise. The results suggest that the recipients of free LLINs were 6 percentage points more likely to redeem their WaterGuard voucher than those who did not receive a full LLIN subsidy. This e¤ect is not signi…cant, and in relative terms, the magnitude of the e¤ect is smaller than that observed for the second LLIN take-up in Table 2 . The take-up of the WaterGuard voucher was 40% on average, and therefore a 6 percentage points increase corresponds to a 15% increase only, in contrast with the 41% increase in take-up observed for the second LLIN among recipients of a free LLIN in Phase 1. The e¤ect on the treated (those who actively used the free LLIN) is greater in magnitude (+15 percentage points, or 37%), but still lower than that observed for the second LLIN (90%).
Overall, these results suggest that both learning and income e¤ects are likely to have played a role in the positive impact of subsidies on willingness to pay for LLINs observed in section 4.2.
Cross-Product Entitlement E¤ects?
Development practitioners often worry that subsidies for one product lead to entitlement e¤ects vis-a-vis other products. In particular, households might expect that the government or NGO that subsidized product A will also soon start to subsidize product B (if product B belongs to the same class of product, say health products), and thus adopt a "wait and see" stance. To test whether this is the case in the Kenyan context, we can exploit the WaterGuard voucher experiment conducted 5 months after the …rst LLIN vouchers were distributed.
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 , showing that the take-up of WaterGuard was not lower among recipients of free LLINs, suggest that cross-product entitlement e¤ects are likely to be limited. In other words, households who get a chance to receive a free LLIN do not seem to expect that other health technologies should be given to them for free in order for them to experiment with them.
E¤ects of Indirect Exposure
4.5.1 Negative Subsidy Spillovers? Testing for "relative price" e¤ects
Since prices in Phase 1 were randomized within areas, households who did not receive the maximum subsidy level o¤ered in the area might have gotten upset or disappointed. They might have felt that they got "the bad end of the bargain", or felt that, since they didn't receive the higher subsidy, it might mean that the product was not really targeted at them, and thus they could do without it. Alternatively, those who got the "best deal"in the village might have felt particularly encouraged to purchase the LLIN.
To test this hypothesis, which we call the "relative price e¤ect"hypothesis, we exploit the fact that the highest subsidy level o¤ered in Phase 1 (i.e., the lowest price o¤ered in Phase 1) randomly varied across areas. We can thus compare households who faced a given price (e.g. 50 Ksh) in two areas, one where 50 Ksh was the lowest price o¤ered, and one where 50
Ksh was not the lowest price because other households received a voucher for a free LLIN. This is done in Table 4 . The sample in this table is restricted to those who received a price in the following set: {40, 50, 70}. At each of these three prices, households in some areas got the best possible price in their area, while households in other areas did not (because other households got a free or cheaper bednet in their area). Table 4 estimates the following equation:
where P hj1 2 f40; 50; 70g and P j min is the minimum price o¤ered in village j: The …nding that b > 0 would imply that, holding price constant, there is a positive e¤ect of being o¤ered the minimum (cheapest) price in the village. As discussed above, such a relative price e¤ect could come from a psychological "feeling lucky / unlucky" e¤ect, or it could work through anticipation of future prices (those who do not have the cheapest price adopt a wait-and-see stance).
Since the treatment studied here (getting the minimum price in a given area) varies across areas and not across individuals within areas, the inclusion of area …xed e¤ects is not possible for this analysis. This limits the interest of this exercise, since there are only 6 areas in the sample (so essentially 6 data points). Despite the randomization, take-up could greatly vary across areas independently of the subsidy level, for example if areas di¤er in their characteristics. This caveat is worth keeping in mind when looking at the results.
The coe¢ cient estimates in Table 4 While we do not …nd evidence of a "relative price e¤ect"in the context of this experiment, we acknowledge that the experimental design at hand might have dampened the likelihood of such e¤ects. This is because prices (subsidies) were randomly allocated, and therefore may not have carried any signal about potential heterogeneity in the returns to using the product. In actual distribution programs, subsidies are often targeted to those who bene…t from the product most (e.g, pregnant women in the case of antimalarial bednets). When the targeting rule can be clearly identi…ed by communities, the risk of "relative price"e¤ect might be heightened. 18 The results in Table 4 are consistent with a model of social learning where households learn from others about the bene…ts of a new technology. The next section directly tests for such social learning e¤ects by exploiting within-area variation in exposure.
Positive Subsidy Spillovers? Testing for di¤usion e¤ects
Non-experimental Evidence Table 5 presents non-experimental social e¤ect estimates.
The sample is restricted to households who received a positively priced voucher in Phase 1.
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Column 1 regresses whether households redeemed their …rst LLIN voucher on the number of households they know had redeemed their voucher. Knowing one more household who redeemed the voucher is correlated with a take-up higher by 12 percentage points (32%).
The take-up is higher by 18 percentage points when the household declares that at least one other household recommended the LLIN to them. These results could be entirely driven by omitted variable bias, however. It is likely that households who redeemed their vouchers were more likely to ask their neighbors if they redeemed theirs too, for example. For these reasons, we next turn to experimental estimates of social learning.
Experimental Evidence Given the large di¤erences in take-up across price groups, the random assignment of households to price groups generate an exogenous source of variation in the density of households that had a chance to experiment with the LLIN.
Using GIS coordinates, we computed, for each household in the sample, the number of sampled households that live within a given radius, and the number and share of them who received a voucher for a given subsidy level. In particular, for households who faced a positive price, we computed the share of households within a given radius who received the maximum subsidy o¤ered in the area (i.e., the share of households who received a voucher for a free LLIN in the two areas where the subsidy reached 100%; the share of households who received a voucher for an LLIN at 40 Ksh in the area where the lowest price as 40Ksh; etc.). We use three di¤erent radii to de…ne social networks or neighborhoods: 250 meters, 500 meters, and 750 meters. Appendix Table A3 Table A3 tests whether these density measures are correlated with the voucher price. Column 1 regresses the price households faced on the share of households with the maximum subsidy within a 250m radius, controlling for the total number of sampled households within that radius. The coe¢ cient on the share is statistically signi…cant at the 10% level, but small in magnitude (a household with 100% of sampled neighbors in the 'maximum subsidy' group faces a price US$ 0.23 (13 Ksh) higher than a household with 0% of sampled neighbors in the maximum subsidy group). If anything, this positive correlation between own price and exposure to neighbors with cheap prices will lead to a downwards bias in the estimates of social learning/spillovers.
None of the other exposure measures have statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients in the price regressions (Table A3 , Panel B, columns 3-6). To con…rm these results and test how sensitive these results are to the choice of the radius, Table 6 reports results from estimating regressions similar to those presented in Table 2 (columns 1 to 4), but including various measures of social exposure to LLIN, and restricting the sample to households that did not receive a free LLIN (i.e, households that received a positive-price voucher). For each radius, we run the following speci…cation:
The regressor of interest is ShareM in j1 , the share of neighbors (within a given radius) who received the minimum price (maximum subsidy) o¤ered in area j in Phase 1. The total number of study households within 500 meters (T otalHH j ) is included as a control variable to account for the fact that people living in more densely populated areas may be more likely to adopt new products.
The results in Table 6 are quantitatively unchanged across all three radius choices. The results suggest that the higher the proportion of neighbors who received the high subsidy, the more likely the household is to have redeemed the voucher and purchased the LLIN.
When looking at the results using the 'within 500m radius' de…nition of social networks, we …nd that, if all of a household's neighbors sampled for the study received the maximum subsidy, the probability of redeeming the voucher increases by 22 percentage points. This implies that households who did not themselves receive a maximum subsidy are over 50% more likely to invest in the LLIN if all of their sampled neighbors received the maximum subsidy. This is a non-trivial e¤ect since the average price households had to pay for the LLIN was 120 Ksh ($1.85), a relatively large sum for rural households in the areas of study.
In Columns 3-4, 7-8 and 11-12 of Table 6 , the independent variable is the share of sampled households within a given radius who are using the LLIN. To overcome the obvious endogeneity issue, we instrument the share using an LLIN with the share of sampled households within that radius who received the maximum subsidy level. In other words, we run:
where ShareU j , the share of households within a given radius who are using an LLIN, is instrumented by ShareM in j1 :
The results con…rm that households learn through their neighbor's experimentation with the product. As discussed earlier, the exclusion restriction does not hold in the presence of contrast e¤ects, therefore the preferred speci…cation remains the reduced form speci…cation.
In Appendix Table A4 , we report results from two alternate speci…cations. First, we include the full distribution of prices around household i, rather than just the share with a zero or very low price. The results are unchanged. Second, we look at levels, rather than densities: the regressor of interest is the total number of households within the radius who have received the high subsidy, instead of the share. The results are somewhat weaker, but the overall pattern is consistent with social learning.
Another possible speci…cation is to look at how take-up of the second LLIN (redemption of the Phase 2 voucher) was a¤ected by exposure via neighbors in Phase 1. The results are presented graphically in Figure 5 (dashed line) and suggests that redemption in Phase 2 was not a¤ected by exposure via neighbors, except at very high levels of exposure, where exposure seems to have a negative e¤ect (though an insigni…cant one). This is likely due to a simple budget constraint e¤ect: households who were encouraged to buy an LLIN in Phase 1 by their neighbors had less cash on hand to acquire a second LLIN in Phase 2.
Overall, these results suggest that exposure through neighbors increased the likelihood that households bought at least one LLIN, but had no impact on the likelihood that households bought both LLINs.
The positive social spillover e¤ects detected here might not be large enough to ensure widespread adoption of LLINs through learning from early adopters in the absence of subsidies. However, what we can say with con…dence from the results above is that large targeted subsidies do not seem to dampen willingness-to-pay among the general population. Rather, large subsidies and the resulting increased take-up among bene…ciaries help increase the overall level of information available on the e¤ectiveness of a new product, and, as a result, seem to increase the willingness to pay among those that do not receive the large subsidy.
Conclusion
It is often argued that that subsidies for high-return technologies (such as bednets, treadle pumps, or fertilizer) in the short-run might be detrimental for their adoption in the long run. There are two main arguments: (1) subsidies may not increase learning about the technology if subsidy recipients do not use the technology; and (2) previously encountered prices may act as "anchors"that a¤ect people's valuation of a product independently of its intrinsic qualities. This can lead to entitlement e¤ects for those who receive the subsidy, and to "relative price"e¤ects for those who are not targeted by the subsidy. This paper used a randomized …eld experiment to estimate the net e¤ect of one-time subsidies on long-run adoption for a health product with high private returns (the antimalarial bednet). We …nd that temporary subsidies for a subset of households increase the average willingness to pay for bednets in the general population, through both learning by doing and social learning e¤ects.
While the randomized experimental design enables us to cleanly identify price e¤ects, a key question concerns the external validity of our …ndings. The technology we introduced was relatively comparable to the status quo technology, therefore households in the sample are likely to have used their beliefs about the usage cost and e¤ectiveness of the status quo technology as priors for the new technology. Because the new technology had both lower usage costs and higher private returns than the status quo, high subsidies helped recipients learn that the true usage cost was lower than expected, thereby increasing immediate adoption and enabling faster learning about the e¤ectiveness of the new technology. In contrast, for a technology or product that would have had no comparable status quo technology, individuals might have vastly underestimated both the usage cost and e¤ectiveness. In such a case, subsidies might not have a¤ected immediate adoption and learning.
Furthermore, because the subsidy was provided by a local research organization, households in the study might have been less likely to exhibit entitlement e¤ects than they would have if the subsidy had been implemented nation-wide by the government. On the other hand, since the implementing agency was local, households might have thought they could induce it to provide high subsidies for everyone by boycotting higher prices. It is di¢ cult to gauge the direction of the bias, and it is possible that in other contexts prices could have larger non-standard e¤ects on demand. The …ndings that subsidies increase learning about the quality of a new product are robust to this caveat, however.
The extent to which the adoption of new products di¤uses through neighbors or friends is a central question, especially for less developed economies where modern di¤usion channels, such as TV commercials, do not reach the great majority of the population. The evidence provided in this paper suggests that, at least for some class of preventative health products, learning by doing and social learning are important channels through which short-term, targeted subsidies can translate into sustained levels of adoption. Table 2 
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